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NOTES
VOUCHING: IN OR OUT?
Vouching in is a common-law procedural device' that allows a defendant
to bind2 other potential parties to the outcome of an action upon notice
1. See Olin's Rent-A-Car Sys. v. Royal Continental Hotels, 187 So.2d 349, 351-52 (Fla.
1966) (roots of vouching in lie deep within common law). The court in Olin's Rent-A-Car Sys.
v. Royal Continental Hotels described vouching in as a procedure that originated in personal
property law, and which courts later adapted to real property. Id. at 351. The Olin's court
explained that vouching in was a product of early Celtic and Teutonic law. Id. at 352 (quoting
DIGBY, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (5th ed. 1875)). In its earliest historical settings,
vouching in was primarily a means for avoiding charges of theft. See E. JENKs, A SHORT
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 12 (5th ed. 1938). For further historical background of vouching in,
see Note, Development of the Common Law Rule Making a Judgment Conclusive Against
Warrantors and Indemnitors, 34 VA. L. REv. 321 (1948) (analysis of history and development
of vouching in beginning with reign of King Hlothaere of Kent in 685 A.D.).
2. See SCAC Transport (USA), Inc. v. S.S. Danaos, 578 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (vouched in party bound by results of all litigated issues regardless of whether vouched
in party appeared and defended original suit); Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv.,
Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, -, 579 P.2d 48, 52 (1978) (plaintiff's notice to defendant of pending
action binds defendant to ultimate judgment). In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv.,
Ltd., the court based part of its decision to bind the vouchee to the original judgment on § 107
of the 1973 Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 119 Ariz. at -, 579
P.2d at 50; see RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 107 (Tent. Draft 1973). According to
the Restatement, if the indemnitee gives the indemnitor reasonable notice of the pending action
and requests the indemnitor to defend the action, both the indemnitee and indemnitor are
bound by the judgment to the extent of the liability of the indemnity. See 119 Ariz. at -
579 P.2d at 50; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 107 (Tent. Draft 1973). The Restatement
explains that since the indemnitor has the ultimate liability, the indemnitee should be able to
shift the burden of trial and the indemnitor should respond to the indemnitee's request for
assistance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 107 comment c (Tent. Draft 1973). The
Litton Systems court described § 107 of the Restatement as a summary of the common-law
procedural device of vouching in. See 119 Ariz. at -, 579 P.2d at 51; see also Dixon v.
Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, -, 509 P.2d 86, 90 (1973) (voucher's proffer
of notice of pending litigation to vouchee binds voucher and vouchee to factual determinations
of original judgment in subsequent litigation). See generally 1 B. J. MOORE, J. LucAS, T.
CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTCE 0.405[9] (2d ed. 1983) (judgment against voucher binds
vouchee to all issues determined in original suit). Professor Moore explains that the factual
determinations necessary for the judgment of the original suit bind the vouchee even if the
vouchee refuses to participate in the defense of the original action. Id. at 248.
3. See Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem 300, 546 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir.
1977) (indemnity court should inquire whether vouchee received notice of original suit); Morris
v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 1974) (court refused to bind vouchee
to voucher's settlement because of absence of notice to vouchee); Glick v. White Motor Co.,
458 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1972) (vouching in is common-law device by which voucher notifies
vouchee of pending suit); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Evans Pipe Co., 432 F.2d 211, 212 (6th Cir.
1970) (vouchee who receives notice of pending suit and demand to defend bound by judgment
of pending action); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hase, 390 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1968)
(vouchee may claim defense of lack of notice in indemnity action); Schoneweather v. L.F.
Richardson, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 692, 693 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (vouching in must contain formal
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and opportunity to defend. 4 Vouching in occurs when a defendant-voucher 5
informs a potentially liable party, or vouchee,6 that notice of the original
suit7 constitutes a formal tender of control of the defense." If the vouchee
refuses the opportunity to defend and the court in the original suit adjudges
the voucher liable, the voucher will look to the vouchee for indem-
nity.9 Controversy surrounding vouching in, however, arises over the fact
that a judgment in the original action may bind 0 a vouchee whether or
notice of pendency of original cause of action); Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash.
App. 689, -, 509 P.2d 86, 90 (1973) (notice to vouchee of pending original suit is essential
element of vouching in).
4. See Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem 300, 546 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir.
1977) (voucher satisfies vouching in requirements by requesting vouchee to appear and defend
original suit); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Evans Pipe Co., 432 F.2d 211, 212 (6th Cir. 1970)
(vouching in requires demand to defend original action); Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales
& Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, -, 579 P.2d 48, 52 (1978) (notice of vouching in must contain
unequivocal demand to undertake defense); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co.,
177 Ind. App. 508, 380 N.E.2d 571, 579 (1978) (voucher must request vouchee to take up
defense of original suit); Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, -, 509
P.2d 86, 90 (1973) (vouching in includes formal tender of right to defend original action).
5. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (5th ed. 1979). A voucher is a defendant in the
original litigation who notifies a potential party of the pending litigation and tenders the defense
of the original pending litigation to the potential party. Id.
6. Id. A vouchee is the potential party to whom the voucher has sent notice and tendered
defense of the original pending litigation. Id.
7. See Squillante, Commercial Code Review, A Summary of Leading Decisions and
Articles, 78 COM. L.J. 320, 380, 415, 444 (1973) (vouching in usually involves original suit
between defendant-voucher and subsequent indemnity suit between original defendant-voucher
and subsequent defendant-vouchee); see also 3 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.02
(2d ed. 1983) (two suits are necessary where voucher is found liable and vouchee refuses to
indemnify). The double litigation element of vouching in has also been discussed in the context
of third-party practice, or impleader. Id. at 14-16 (discussing FED. R. CIv. PROC. 14); see also
infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text (comparing impleader with vouching in).
8. See Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, -, 579 P.2d
48, 52 (1978) (voucher must offer to surrender control of action to vouchee); Moyses v. Spartan
Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich. 314, 332-33, 174 N.W.2d 797, 805 (1970) (voucher must tender
opportunity to control defense to vouchee); U.S. Wire & Cable Co. v. Ascher Corp., 34 N.J.
121, -, 167 A.2d 633, 637 (1961) (voucher should tender defense of action to vouchee
immediately after institution of suit).
9. See Hessler v. Hillwood Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir. 1962) (judgment against
voucher in original action entitled voucher to indemnity from vouchee in subsequent suit);
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, -, 579 P.2d 48, 50 (1978)
(vouchee-manufacturer must indemnify voucher-distributor on judgment based on strict liability
in tort when vouchee had notice of action and refused to defend); see also supra note 2
(discussing rationale underlying vouchee's duty to indemnify).
10. See supra note 2 (discussing binding effect of vouching in); cf. Mitsui & Company,
Inc. v. S.S. Attica, No. 79 Civ. 3191-CSH (S.D.N.Y. September 20, 1983) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (good faith settlement of original suit raises rebuttable presumption
of liability in subsequent indemnity action). But see SCAC Transport (USA), Inc. v. S.S.
Danaos, 578 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court refused to bind vouchee to arbitration
findings). In SCAC Transport (USA), Inc. v. S.S. Danaos, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York refused to allow the findings of an arbitration board to
bind the vouchee in the voucher's suit for indemnity. Id. at 331. The Danaos court based its
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not the court in the original action possessed jurisdiction" over the
vouchee. This "extra-jurisdictional"' 2 quality of vouching in potentially
conflicts with modern notions of due process 13 and personal jurisdic-
decision in part on the fact that the vouchee had not consented to an arbitration forum and,
therefore, had not been afforded a full and fair opportunity to contest liability. Id. at 329.
11. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1877). The United States Supreme Court in
Pennoyer v. Neff laid the framework for modern jurisdictional analysis. Id. According to the
Court in Pennoyer, the territorial limits of a state restricted the authority of every tribunal
within the state. Id. The Supreme Court explained that any attempt to exceed those territorial
limits was an illegitimate assumption of power. Id. The Supreme Court later relaxed these strict
territorial limitations, however, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court abandoned Pennoyer's requirement that a
defendant must be present or own property in a state to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
state. Id. After International Shoe, a defendant came under the jurisdiction of a state's courts
by manifesting his "presence" there through certain "minimum contacts." Id. at 316-17. The
International Shoe Court defined the phrase "minimum contacts" as the criteria by which to
determine whether the defendant's activities bring him within the state's personal jurisdiction.
Id. The Court's inquiry focused on whether a defendant's contacts were sufficient to make it
reasonable to require the defendant to defend a suit in a foreign court. Id. at 317. The most
recent Supreme Court cases discussing the imposition of a state court's jurisdictional powers
over a foreign defendant continue to use the minimum contacts analysis. See Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1478-79 (1984) (state's assertion of personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendant predicated on minimum contacts between defendant and state). Vouching
in, however, imposes the power of a state on a non-forum defendant without a jurisdictional
or minimum contacts analysis. See Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem 300, 546 F.2d
1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1977) (vouchee bound by foreign state judgment even though foreign state
court lacked jurisdiction over vouchee).
12. See Note, Does Voucher to Warranty Belong in the U.C.C.?, 18 STAN. L. REv. 666,
671-76 (1966) (coining term "extra-jurisdictionality" to refer to vouching in). More recent
Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction appear to conflict with the lack of territorial
limitations on the power of state courts. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 291, 294 (1980) (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)
(limiting powers of state courts); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (emphasizing
territorial limitations on power of respective states)). The Supreme Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson emphasized that restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts are a result of territorial limitations on the power of the states. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (evolving flexibility of state boundaries does not signal end to restrictions
on personal jurisdiction)). The World-Wide Volkswagen Court reasserted the element of state
sovereignty that originally appeared in Pennoyer v. Neff. See 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980). The
World-Wide Volkswagen Court held that the focus of a personal jurisdiction analysis must be
on the due process clause as an "instrument of interstate federalism" which may "act to divest
the State of its power to render a valid judgment." See id. at 294. The language of World-
Wide Volkswagen is crucial to an analysis of vouching in, since vouching in asserts the power
of a state's judgments while ignoring state territorial and jurisdictional boundaries. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem 300, 546 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1977) (foreign
state judgment bound vouchee despite fact that vouchee was not within personal jurisdiction of
foreign state court).
13. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state
shall ". . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
The elements of notice and opportunity to be heard which constitute traditional notions of due
process are similar to the notice and opportunity requirements of vouching in. See Harper v.
District Court of Oklahoma County, 484 P.2d 891, 895 (1971) (due process consists of notice
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tion.14 The concept of due process minimally requires notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before a tribunal having jurisdiction over the action and
full power to grant relief. 5 In apparent contravention of contemporary
notions of personal jurisdiction and due process, 6 vouching in may bind the
vouchee to a judgment even if the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the
vouchee.' 7 Recent personal jurisdiction cases,' 8 therefore, warrant particular
scrutiny in resolving the apparent conflict between vouching in and modern
notions of due process and personal jurisdiction.
and opportunity to be heard before tribunal having jurisdiction and power to grant relief);
Pryor v. Western Paving Co., 74 OkI. 308, -, 184 P. 88, 89 (1919) (due process requires
notice and opportunity to appear and defend before tribunal of competent jurisdiction). The
disparity between the concepts of vouching in and due process occurs because vouching in
requires only notice and opportunity to be heard, while due process requires the tribunal hearing
the action to have personal jurisdiction over the parties as well. See Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc.
v. Barge Chem 300, 546 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1977) (vouchee bound by judgment of
original suit although not subject to personal jurisdiction of court hearing original action).
14. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (emphasiz-
ing importance of state boundaries for purposes of personal jurisdiction analysis). The World-
Wide Volkswagen Court explained that the due process clause will not allow a state to make a
binding judgment against a defendant with whom the state has no contacts or relations. Id. at
294; see infra note 16 (discussing nature of jurisdictional contacts). The due process clause
limits the power of state courts to render valid personal judgments against foreign defendants.
Id. at 291. According to the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, due process requires that a
defendant receive adequate notice of the action and be subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the court. Id.
15. See supra note 13 (describing elements of due process).
16. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980). The
Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen reaffirmed the rule that a state court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only if sufficient minimum contacts exist
between the defendant and the forum state. Id. at 291. The World-Wide Volkswagen Court
explained that the concept of minimum contacts performs two functions. Id. First, the concept
protects defendants against the burdens of litigating in distant or inconvenient forums. Id. at
292. Second, the minimum contacts analysis ensures that the states, through their courts, do
not reach beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system. Id. Vouching in, however, is used specifically to extend the power of state court
judgments over nonresident vouchees. See Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem 300, 546
F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1977) (original judgment of liability bound vouchee who was not
within personal jurisdiction of court hearing original action); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket
& Mfg. Co., 177 Ind. App. 508, __, 308 N.E.2d 571, 579 (1978) (personal service of process
not necessary to bind vouchee); Moyses v. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich. 314, 332,
174 N.W.2d 797, 805 (1970) (process of vouching in is valid method for binding third parties
outside the jurisdictional reach of state courts).
17. See supra note 16 (discussing binding effect of vouching in despite lack of jurisdiction).
18. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (minimum contacts is standard
for determining whether exercise of jurisdiction complies with due process). In Shaffer v.
Heitner, the United States Supreme Court declared that if a direct assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant violated due process, then an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction
was equally impermissible. Id. at 209. Vouching in appears inconsistent with the Court's
declaration in Shaffer because vouching in is used to bind the vouchee when jurisdiction is
absent. See, e.g., Moyses v. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich. 314, 332, 174 N.W.2d 797,
805 (1970) (vouching in binds third parties who are outside jurisdictional reach of state courts).
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The United States Supreme Court originally defined the modern param-
eters of personal jurisdiction and due process in the landmark case of
Pennoyer v. Neff.'9 In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court pronounced that every
state possessed exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and prop-
erty within its territory. 20 The converse of the Court's proposition was equally
clear: no state could exercise direct jurisdiction or authority over persons or
property outside the state's boundaries.2' The Pennoyer Court further de-
scribed due process as a course of legal proceedings consistent with the rules
and principles of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private
rightsn To give legal proceedings validity, the reviewing tribunal, therefore,
must be competent to pass upon the subject matter of the suit and have
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.?
The Supreme Court later expanded the rigid state jurisdictional bound-
aries drawn by Pennoyer in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.24 In
International Shoe, the Court held that a person need not be present or own
property in a state to come under the jurisdiction of the state's courts?25 A
In the vouching in process, the vouchee's obligation to indemnify the voucher travels with
the person of the voucher. This phenomenon is quite similar to the concept of transient
jurisdiction discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Balk. See 198 U.S. 215,
222 (1905) (debt follows debtor to other states). In Harris v. Balk, the Court characterized a
debt as travelling with the debtor and not remaining with the creditor-owner. Id. The property
of the creditor-owner, therefore, travelled with the debtor and came under the jurisdiction and
power of any forum into which the debtor ventured. Id. Several decades later, the United States
Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner severely criticized this notion of transient jurisdiction
predicated on movable obligations or property. See 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (fiction that
assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but assertion of jurisdiction over owner of
property is without substantial modern justification). Although the Supreme Court has not
explicitly discarded the concept of transient jurisdiction, the Court has harshly questioned its
validity. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980) (court
disparages mechanical rule that creditor's amenability to suit travels with debtor).
19. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
20. See id. at 722. The Supreme Court in Pennoyer explained that one of the principals
underlying state jurisdiction over persons and property is the concept of exclusive state
sovereignty. Id.
21. See id. at 720. According to the Court in Pennoyer, the territorial limits of a state
restrict the authority of every tribunal located within the state. Id. Any exercise of authority
beyond the territorial limits of the state was an improper assumption of power. Id. The Court
described the limitations on individual state power as protections to ensure the equal dignity
and authority of the states as independent sovereigns. Id. at 722.
22. See id. at 733 (due process requires system of procedures and doctrines for protection
of individual rights).
23. See id. The Court in Pennoyer explained that defendants may challenge the validity
of judgments and resist their enforcement on the ground that the court hearing the action
lacked jurisdiction over the parties. Id. A court's determination of the rights and obligations
of parties over whom the court lacks jurisdiction is inconsistent with due process of law. Id.
24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
25. See id. at 316. The United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington explained that prior to the holding in International Shoe, the jurisdiction of courts
was grounded on the courts' power over the defendant's person. Id. The defendant's presence
1985]
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defendant could come within the jurisdiction of a state's courts by manifest-
ing his "presence" within the state through certain "minimum contacts."
'26
The Court in International Shoe, however, refused to construct a mechanical
or quantitative scheme to define minimum contacts.27 Instead, the Court
focused on the nature and quality of the defendant's activities28 within the
state to ascertain whether maintenance of the suit offended "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." 29
Following the decision in International Shoe, the Supreme Court contin-
ued to expand the parameters of state court jurisdiction. In McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co.,30 the Court noted that Pennoyer had
depicted the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a restriction
on the power of state courts to enter binding judgments against persons not
served with process within state boundaries." The Court in McGee, however,
pointed to a distinct historical trend toward expanding the scope of state
court jurisdiction in decisions subsequent to Pennoyer.32 For example, the
Supreme Court further clarified when the defendant's activities or "contacts"
,would subject him to the jurisdiction of state courts in Hanson v. Denckla.
33
According to the Court in Hanson, the essential inquiry in each jurisdictional
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, therefore, was a prerequisite to rendering a valid
judgment binding the defendant. Id.
26. Id. In International Shoe, the Supreme Court stated that even if a defendant was not
personally within the territory of a state forum, the state nonetheless could subject the defendant
to a valid judgment. Id. The Court held that due process requires only that the defendant have
certain "minimum contacts" with the forum such that maintenance of a suit did not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
27. See id. at 319. The criteria by which the International Shoe Court measured the
activities that justified subjection of a corporation or individual to suit were not mechanical or
quantitative. Id. Rather, the Court's inquiry centered upon whether the contacts were sufficient
in the context of a federal system of government to make it reasonable to require a corporation
or individual to defend in a foreign forum. Id. at 317.
28. See id. at 319. The Court in International Shoe indicated that due process depends
upon the quality and nature of a defendant's activities within the forum. Id. The due process
clause does not allow a state to make binding judgments against defendants with whom the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Id.
29. See id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (court examined
whether process of serving notice was "fair").
30. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
31. See id. at 222. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., the United States Supreme
Court stated that since Pennoyer v. Neff, the Supreme Court had held that the due process
clause limits the powers of state courts to enter binding judgments against foreign defendants.
Id.
32. See id. Examining the development of personal jurisdiction, the McGee Court dis-
cerned a clear trend toward expanding the scope of state court jurisdiction over foreign
corporations and other nonresidents. Id. The McGee Court attributed the expansive trend in
part to a transformation in the national economy. Id. The Court noted that modern commercial
transactions often touch two or more states and involve parties separated by the full continent.
Id. at 223.
33. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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analysis was whether there was some act by which the defendant had
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state.
4
The most recent Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction,
however, have reemphasized the importance of territorial limitations on the
power of state courts, a theme originally discussed by the Court in the
Pennoyer decision. 35 The Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson,3 6 for example, emphasized that the trend of expanding state court
powers did not signal the end of restrictions on personal jurisdiction. 37 The
World-Wide Volkswagen Court stated explicitly that the territorial restric-
tions on personal jurisdiction were more than simply a shield against incon-
venient or distant litigation. 8 Rather, restrictions on the personal jurisdiction
of state courts are a consequence of territorial limitations on state sover-
eignty.39 The World-Wide Volkswagen Court, thereby, reasserted the prin-
ciple that a state may not exercise power over a defendant unless the
defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state.40 The due process
clause thus limits the power of the state courts to render valid personal
judgments against nonresident defendants. 41 According to the Supreme Court
in World-Wide Volkswagen, due process requires that the defendant receive
adequate notice of the pending action42 and possess sufficient minimum
34. See id. at 253. The United States Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla declared that
for a state court to assert its jurisdictional power over a nonresident defendant, it was essential
that the defendant had availed himself of the privileges of the forum state, thereby invoking
the benefits and protections of the state's laws. Id.
35. See supra notes 12 and 16 (discussing territorial restrictions on state court jurisdiction).
36. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
37. See id. at 294 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)) (relaxation
of state jurisdictional boundaries does not herald demise of all restrictions on personal
jurisdiction). The World-Wide Volkswagen Court declared that the Supreme Court never had
accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes. 444 U.S. at
293.
38. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)) (restrictions on personal jurisdiction are more
than merely shield against inconvenient litigation).
39. See id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958)) (territorial limitations
on states create restrictions on assertion of personal jurisdiction by state courts).
40. See id. at 291 (state court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident unless
minimum contacts exist between defendant and forum state). A state cannot enter a judgment
attempting to bind a person over whom it has no jurisdiction. Id. Due process requires that the
court possess personal jurisdiction over the defendant and that the defendant receive adequate
notice of the suit. Id.
41. See id. (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978)) (due
process clause operates as limitation on state court jurisdiction to enter judgments affecting
rights or interests of nonresident defendants).
42. See id. (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950))
(due process demands that notice of action precede any adjudication involving deprivation of
life, liberty, or property).
1985]
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contacts with the forum state to render him subject to the personal jurisdic-
tion of the court hearing the action. 43 A judgment rendered in violation of
due process is void and is not entitled to full faith and credit.4
Vouching in, however, binds the vouchee even if the court hearing the
original action lacks personal jurisdiction over the vouchee. 4s Although the
original court cannot assert jurisdiction over an absent vouchee, the judgment
of the original action binds the vouchee in a second suit for indemnity.
4 6
Vouching in, therefore, appears to conflict with the Supreme Court's defi-
nitions of due process and personal jurisdiction since vouching is used
specifically to bind nonappearing vouchees who are not within the jurisdiction
of the court hearing the original suit.47 Although the full faith and credit
43. See id. (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (state
may not make binding judgment against defendant in absence of personal jurisdiction).
44. See id. (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1878) (judgment by court
lacking personal jurisdiction over defendant is void)); see also U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1 (stating
that ". . . Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other state.") The Supreme Court in Pennoyer explained that if
a court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, then the court has no authority
to adjudicate the personal rights and obligations of the defendant. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
at 732. A judgment rendered by a state tribunal that lacks jurisdiction over the party is not
entitled to any credit or respect in the rendering state, or in any other state. Id. In vouching
in, however, a court lacking jurisdiction over the vouchee adjudicates the vouchee's rights and
obligations. See Moyses v. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich. 314, 332, 174 N.W.2d 797,
805 (1970) (vouching in allows court to bind vouchee who is outside jurisdictional reach of
court); see also infra notes 104-24 and accompanying text (discussing vouching in's extra-
jurisdictional presumption of preclusive power). This indirect assertion of power by a court
over a defendant not within the personal jurisdiction of the court appears to conflict with
modern notions of due process and personal jurisdiction. See supra note 18 (discussing
declaration of Shaffer v. Heitner that if direct assertion of personal jurisdiction violates due
process then indirect assertion of jurisdiction is also invalid). But see infra notes 125-51 and
accompanying text (reconciling extra-jurisdictionality of vouching in with modern notions of
personal jurisdiction by emphasizing fairness aspect of due process analysis).
45. See SCAC Transport (USA), Inc. v. S.S. Danaos, 578 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (vouching in is valid procedure for binding parties over whom personal jurisdiction cannot
be obtained). The doctrine of vouching in does not violate due process, however, since the
court adjudicating the vouchee's obligation to indemnify the voucher does not actually assert
personal jurisdiction over the vouchee. Id. Rather, the court adjudges the voucher's liability,
and the vouchee is bound by this determination in the subsequent suit for indemnity, regardless
of whether the vouchee appeared and defended in the original action. Id. Vouching in, therefore,
does not appear inconsistent with due process or personal jurisdiction, since the court exercises
its power only over the "property" of the vouchee, i.e., the vouchee's obligation to indemnify,
rather than over the person of the vouchee. However, an assertion of jurisdiction over property
is simply an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property. See Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (discarding fiction that assertion of jurisdiction over property is
anything but assertion of jurisdiction over owner of property).
46. See, e.g., SCAC Transport (USA), Inc. v. S.S. Danaos, 578 F. Supp. 327, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (judgment of original action binds vouchee in second suit for indemnity despite
lack of personal jurisdiction over vouchee); Moyses v. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co., 383 Mich.
314, 332, 174 N.W.2d 797, 805 (1970) (vouching in allows court to bind vouchee who is outside
jurisdictional reach of court).
47. See supra note 16 (discussing binding effect of vouching in despite lack of personal
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clause of the United States Constitution requires that each state recognize
and give credit to the lawful judgments of sister states,4 a prerequisite to
lawful judgments is jurisdiction over the parties to the judgment in question.
4 9
In vouching in, this prerequisite is absent.
The conflict between vouching in and personal jurisdiction derives in
part from the fact that vouching in developed in English common law, in
which jurisdiction was not an issue.5 0 The earliest American decisions dis-
cussing vouching in involved no jurisdictional complications, and the Amer-
ican courts simply applied the broad language of vouching in appearing in
English decisions."' In Carpenter v. Pier,5 2 the first American case to discuss
the jurisdictional implications of vouching in, the court avoided the jurisdic-
tional problem of binding a defendant over whom the court had no
jurisdiction by basing its decision on an alternative ground.5 1 In Boyd v.
jurisdiction over vouchee); see also supra notes 13 & 14 (defining elements of due process as
notice to the parties to the action, opportunity to the parties to appear and defend the action,
and jurisdiction of the court over the parties to the action).
48. See U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 1 (stating that "... Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state"); see
also supra note 44 (discussing full faith and credit clause).
49. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 715, 733 (1877) (validity of court's judgment rests on
proper exercise of jurisdiction over parties).
50. See, e.g., Duffield v. Scott, 3 Term R. 374, 100 Eng. Rep. 628, 630 (K.B. 1789). In
sweeping and unqualified language, the English court in Duffield v. Scott declared that a
claimant's demand upon an indemnitee was equivalent to a judgment against the indemnitor if
the indemnitor had notice of the demand and refused to defend the claim. Id. The judgment
of the first action estopped the indemnitor from maintaining that the indemnitee-defendant in
the first action had no duty to pay the judgment. Id.; see Does Voucher to Warranty Belong
in the U.C.C.?, supra note 12, at 673 (asserting that extra-jurisdictional quality of vouching in
developed accidentally). English courts were not concerned with the jurisdictional problems
which now confront American courts and, therefore, used broad language to state that all
vouchees were bound by any subsequent indemnity actions. See Does Voucher to Warranty
Belong in the U.C.C.?, supra note 12, at 672. The English courts' neglect of jurisdictional
concerns derives from the English system's concept of a single sovereignty residing in the person
of the king. I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, TtE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 182 (1903). England's
government was characterized by a centralized unitary system whereas America was a federal
system composed of independent sovereignties. W. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION,
SIGNIFICANCE 140 (1964). The characterization of vouching in by the English cases, therefore,
is inconsistent with the American system of federalism comprised of states acting as independent
sovereigns.
51. See, e.g., Davis v. Wilbourne, 19 S.C.L. (I Hill) 27, 28 (1833). The court in Davis v.
Wilbourne stated that notice of vouching in makes the vouchee privy to the record of the case
and binds the vouchee to the record to the extent that his rights have been tried and adjudged.
Id.
52. 30 Vt. 81 (1858).
53. See id. In Carpenter v. Pier, the defendant, a resident of Vermont, sold and warranted
a note to the plaintiff, a resident of New York. Id. The plaintiff subsequently brought suit in
New York against the maker of the note and the suit resulted in a judgment against the plaintiff.
Id. The plaintiff-voucher sent notice of the original suit to the defendant-vouchee and requested
that the vouchee attend the hearing. Id. The vouchee refused to appear and defend the suit. Id.
The court in Carpenter first addressed whether the judgment of a New York state court should
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Whitfield,54 the next American case directly addressing the conflict between
vouching in and personal jurisdiction, the Boyd court simply ignored the
vouchee's argument that, since the state court lacked jurisdiction over the
vouchee, it also lacked the power to bind a foreign vouchee to the state
court's judgment.
55
Many American courts have failed to address the personal jurisdictional
aspects of due process or have concluded flatly that vouching in does not
violate due process. For example, the United States Supreme Court in
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Schmidt 6 bound the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Company to the judgment of an earlier suit in which the
railroad company was not a party. The Louisville & Nashville Court held
that the requirements of due process were satisfied when the vouchee received
proper notice and had adequate opportunity to appear and defend.57 The
Court in Louisville & Nashville intimated, however, that the extent of the
vouchee's involvement in the original suit might be an element of the due
process analysis: 8 In State Bank of New Prague v. American Surety Co. ,9
however, the Supreme Court of Minnesota asserted that the extent of the
vouchee's involvement in the original action is not always an element in
determining whether vouching in violates jurisdictional aspects of due proc-
ess.60 Citing the United States Supreme Court decision in Louisville &
Nashville, the New Prague court explained that the due process requirements
were satisfied because the vouchee had had notice and an opportunity to
defend, and not because the vouchee had participated in the defense. 6' After
be received in Vermont as conclusive upon a Vermont vouchee. Id. at 85. The Carpenter court
pointed out that the conclusive effect of a judgment rests upon the authority of the court to
act within its jurisdiction. Id. at 86. The Carpenter court did not decide whether mere notice
to appear and defend in another state would give the foreign court jurisdiction to bind the
vouchee. Id. Rather, the Carpenter court held that on the facts of the case, the vouchee had
been sufficiently involved in the original suit to manifest privity and connection with the suit
and the foreign court. Id. at 88. The liability of the vouchee, therefore, was determined by the
original judgment of the foreign court. Id.
54. 19 Ark. 447 (1858).
55. See id. at 467 (suit involving warranty of title to slaves). In Boyd v. Whitfield, the
plaintiff was a Virginia resident who claimed title to slaves in Arkansas. Id. at 463. The plaintiff
argued that to require warrantors to defend title in distant states by forcing warrantors of
personal property to follow the property to the domicile of the vendee would place a grievous
burden on vendors. Id. at 451. The Boyd court, however, did not mention this argument in its
decision. The Boyd court instead based its judgment upon the broad language of other vouching
cases which held that notice to the warrantor-vouchee binds the warrantor-vouchee to the extent
that the vouchee's rights have been adjudged. Id. at 467-68 (citing Davis v. Wilbourne, 19
S.C.L. (I Hill) 27, 28 (1833)); cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
296 (1980) (seller's amenability to suit does not travel with his chattel).
56. 177 U.S. 230 (1899).
57. See id. at 236 (notice and opportunity to appear and defend satisfy due process).
58. See id. at 238-39.
59. 288 N.W. 7 (Minn. 1939).
60. Id. at 10.
61. See id. at 11. In State Bank of New Prague v. American Surety Co., the vouchee
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reviewing Louisville & Nashville and the history of vouching in, the New
Prague court flatly concluded that vouching in did not violate due process
because vouching in had been the law of the land for nearly five centuries. 62
The New Prague court's analysis of the due process implications of vouching
in, therefore, may have been simply an application of the principle of stare
decisis 63 rather than a reasoned judicial analysis. 64
Only two other cases have considered the issue of whether vouching in
violates due process. Paraphrasing the language of the courts in Louisville
& Nashville and New Prague, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. J.R. Clark Co. 65 stated that the requirements of
due process of law are satisfied when the voucher has transmitted notice of
the suit to the vouchee and has afforded the vouchee an opportunity to
appear by tendering defense of the suit. 66 Similarly, the Arizona Court of
Appeals in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Service, Ltd.67 disposed
of any due process problems in one sentence, stating that binding the vouchee
to the judgment of the original suit does not violate due process if the
vouchee received proper notice of the original action. 68 A more thorough
analysis of the elements of vouching in, personal jurisdiction, and due
process is warranted, however, if vouching in is to retain its validity and
viability in modern litigation.
To ascertain whether modern litigators may still employ vouching in as
neither appeared nor participated in the defense of the original suit. Id. at 9. The vouchee in
New Prague, therefore, claimed to be a "stranger" to the original litigation since the original
suit failed to name him as a party in interest. Id. at 10. The New Prague court disposed of the
vouchee's argument, however, by stating that once notice had been given and the defense had
been tendered, the vouchee was no longer a stranger to the action. Id. The New Prague court
reasoned that since the vouchee had the right to appear and defend the suit and the opportunity
to employ the same tactics and procedures as if the vouchee had been the party of record, the
vouchee could not assert immunity from the binding effects of the original judgment. Id.
Emphasizing the Supreme Court's language in Louisville & Nashville, the New Prague court
declared that the vouchee's receipt of notice and an adequate opportunity to defend satisfied
all the requirements of due process. Id. at 11 (citing Louisville & Nashville Rd. Co. v. Schmidt,
177 U.S. 230 (1900)).
62. See 288 N.W. at 11. The New Prague court reviewed the history of vouching in
discussed by Blackstone and Pollock and Maitland. Id. The New Prague court explained that
vouchees are not vouched in as parties of record. Id. Unfortunately, the New Prague court did
not develop the rationale underlying vouching in. Rather, the New Prague court stated merely
that the practice of vouching in had become so well established that neither the courts nor legal
commentators felt a need to assign reasons for the development of vouching in. Id.
63. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Briceland, 31 111. Dec. 128, 75 Il1. App. 3d 189, 394 N.E.2d
44, 46 (1979) (stare decisis is policy of courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled
points of law).
64. See supra note 61 (discussing New Prague court's superficial explanation of vouching
in).
65. 239 Minn. 511, 59 N.W.2d 899 (1953).
66. Id. at -, 59 N.W.2d at 904.
67. 119 Ariz. 10, 579 P.2d 48 (1978).
68. Id. at -, 579 P.2d at 52 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Clark Co., 239 Minn.
511, -_, 59 N.W. 2d, 899, 904 1953)).
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a procedural device, it is important to analyze the elements and mechanics
of the vouching in process. Vouching in consists of a tendered defense in
which the voucher notifies the vouchee of the pendency of the original suit
against the voucher.6 9 Moreover, the voucher must advise the vouchee that
the notice constitutes a formal tender of control of defense of the action
and that if the court in the pending suit adjudges the voucher liable, the
voucher will look to the vouchee for indemnity.70 Finally, the voucher must
inform the vouchee that the vouchee will be bound by the factual determi-
nations underlying the original judgment.7 ' In short, vouching in is notice to
the vouchee to stand by and defend or prepare to be bound by the outcome
of the original action.
2
The United States Supreme Court outlined the parameters of notice
necessary to comply with due process in the landmark case of Mullane v.
Central Hanover Trust Co.7 13 The Court first stated that a fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding is that notice must be reason-
ably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and to afford the parties an opportunity to present objections.7 4 The Court
in Mullane also explained that notice must reasonably convey necessary
information about the litigation to interested parties7" and must afford a
reasonable time for interested parties to appear.7 6 After Mullane, the due
process test for the validity of notice of vouching in is, therefore, whether
the notice is reasonably calculated to apprise the vouchee of the pendency
69. See Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem 300, 546 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir.
1977) (indemnity court should inquire whether vouchee received notice of original suit); Glick
v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1292 n.8 (3d Cir. 1972) (vouching in is common-law device
by which voucher notifies vouchee of pending suit); Schoneweather v. L.F. Richardson, Inc.,
122 F. Supp. 692, 693 (W.D. Mo. 1954) (vouching in must contain formal notice of pendency
of original cause of auction); Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10,
-, 579 P.2d 48, 52 (1978) (notice of vouching in must contain full and fair information con-
cerning pending suit).
70. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Evans Pipe Co., 432 F.2d 211, 212 (6th Cir. 1970)
(vouching in requires voucher to demand vouchee to defend original action); Litton Systems,
Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, -, 579 P.2d 48, 52 (1978) (notice of
vouching in must contain unequivocal demand to undertake defense); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers
Gasket & Mfg. Co., 177 Ind. App. 508, -, 380 N.E.2d 571, 579 (1978) (voucher must
request vouchee to take up defense of original suit; see also supra notes 2 & 9 (discussing
vouchee's duty to indemnify).
71. See supra note 2 (discussing binding effect of vouching in).
72. See City of Waco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 76 F.2d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 1935)
(describing vouching in as notice warning vouchee to defend action).
73. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
74. See id. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (under concept of
due process, service of process must be reasonably calculated to give actual notice and an
opportunity to be heard).
75. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (object of notice
must be to inform absentee of action).
76. See id. at 314 (citing Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900) (notice must allow
sufficient time to enable party to prepare defense)).
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of the original action and to afford the vouchee an opportunity to present
objections.
Courts evaluating the sufficiency of notice of vouching in have held that
notice may be either oral or written77 and can consist of various forms such
as letters or telegrams. 78 A series of letters and communications viewed as a
whole also can demonstrate sufficient notice of vouching in.7 9 The wary
voucher, however, may prefer the precaution of certified mail80 to convey
notice of vouching in. The use of certified mail also will help the voucher
avoid the admonition of the Supreme Court in Mullane that notice which is
a mere gesture does not comport with due process.'
Although courts have not required a uniform type of notice 2 so long as
the notice that the vouchee receives is adequate, 3 the substantive content of
the notice is essential to meet due process requirements. In evaluating the
77. See Bouleris v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 318, 319, 256 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (vouching in is informal procedure in which notice may be written or oral). But
cf. 4 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607.66 (3d ed. 1983)
(vouching in under U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(a) is formal procedure that requires notice of vouching
to be in writing).
78. See Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem 300, 546 F.2d 1125, 1126 (5th Cir.
1977) (voucher informed vouchee of accident and resulting litigation by telegram). In addition
to sending a telegram, the voucher's attorney in Wisconsin Barge Line sent a letter to the
vouchee concerning the pending litigation. Id.
79. See Hase v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 266 F. Supp. 952, 956 (E.D. Mo. 1967)
(series of letters and meetings between voucher and vouchee was sufficient to satisfy notice
requirements), aff'd, 390 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1968).
80. See Morris v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 1974) (court
recommends precaution of registered or certified mail despite informal nature of vouching in
device). In Morris v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit emphasized that the absence of acknowledged receipt of vouching in notice places a
heavy burden of proof on the voucher who later attempts to enforce liability in a subsequent
indemnity action against the vouchee. Id.
81. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The United States
Supreme Court in Mullane specified that the form of notice selected must be such that one who
truly desired to inform an absent party might choose that form. Id. A chosen form or method
of notice has constitutional validity only if it is reasonably certain to inform those affected by
the pending action. Id.
82. See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 87 F. Supp. 854, 858 (E.D.N.Y.
1949) (rights of parties should not turn upon form of notice unless notice falls to sufficiently
apprise vouchee of his interests), rev'd, on other grounds, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950). In
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, a longshoreman injured by a faulty guyline sued
the shipowner for his injuries. Id. at 859. The shipowner sent a written notice of vouching in
to the stevedore, calling for indemnity. Id. at 858. The shipowner requested the stevedore to
indemnify the shipowner for any judgments, costs, or expenses in connection with the suit
pending against the shipowner. Id. The stevedore argued that the form of the owner's notice
constituted a suit against the stevedore as a joint tortfeasor rather than an indemnity action
and, therefore, was ineffectual as a proper notice of vouching in. Id. The Matthews court
disagreed, however, stating that a vouching in notice was insufficient only if the language of
the notice caused the vouchee to ignore the notice. Id.
83. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text (discussing elements constituting proper
notice of vouching in).
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content of notice, however, courts do not examine the content in a vacuum,
but place the notice within the context of information known to the vouchee s4
For example courts may consider the vouchee's familiarity with court pro-
cedures and with the vouching in device in general.8 5 In West Indian Co. v.
S.S. Empress of Canada,16 the form of notice which the voucher employed
contained all of the components necessary for a proper notice of vouching
in.87 The tendered notice gave a clear explanation of the pending suit and
contained an explicit demand to the vouchee to undertake the defense of the
impending action. 8 Moreover, the notice contained an offer from the voucher
to surrender control of the original suit, and warned that the judgment in
the original action could conclusively bind the vouchee s9 In short, all essential
elements of vouching in were present in the notice.
In addition to the requirement that notice be clear and reasonably
calculated to inform interested parties, 90 the Court in Mullane specified that
84. See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 87 F. Supp. 854, 858-59 (E.D.N.Y.
1949). The Matthews court pointed to several factors that supported the voucher's claim that
the vouchee had received adequate notice. Id. Of particular importance to the Matthews court
was the fact that the voucher had attached a copy of the original complaint to the vouching in
notice. Id. at 859. The Matthews court stated that the language of the complaint combined with
the language of the vouching in notice effectively disposed of the stevedore's contention that
he had not been placed on notice that the issue of the stevedore's negligence would be litigated.
Id. Attaching a copy of the original complaint to any written notice of vouching in has many
advantages to the voucher. For example, confronting the vouchee with a court document adds
seriousness to what otherwise could be taken as an idle threat. Moreover, attaching a copy of
the complaint complies with Mullane's requirement that the vouching in notice be reasonably
calculated to inform the vouchee of the pending action. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). A voucher truly desirous of informing the vouchee of the
original action, therefore, should attach a copy of the original complaint to the notice of
vouching in. Id.; see also supra note 81 (discussing Mullane definition of proper notice).
85. See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 87 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D.N.Y.
1949) (noting that state courts were thoroughly familiar with vouching in process). The Matthews
court found support in other vouching in cases decided in that jurisdiction. Id. The court also
noted that the local rules of civil procedure discussed the vouching in device. Id. at 860-61.
86. 277 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
87. See supra notes 69 & 70 (discussing elements of vouching in).
88. See id. at 2. In West Indian Co. v. S.S. Empress of Canada, the S.S. Empress of
Canada collided with two cranes owned and operated by the plaintiff. Id. The collision occurred
when the S.S. Empress of Canada was leaving the plaintiff's dock in St. Thomas, Virgin
Islands. Id. The plaintiff initiated an admiralty action based on negligence against the S.S.
Empress of Canada and the owner of the ship, the Canadian Pacific Railroad Company. Id.
The Canadian Pacific Railroad Company attempted to vouch in the pilot of the ship and the
Department of Commerce of the Virgin Islands. Id. The notice in West Indian stated that the
plaintiff had instituted the action against the defendant-vouchers. Id. The notice further stated
that the voucher would look to the vouchees for indemnity and that the vouchees had 20 days
in which to appear and defend the action. Id. Finally, the notice said that if the vouchees
refused to appear and defend, then the vouchees would be bound by the voucher's defense and
disposition of the original action. Id.
89. Id.; see supra notes 69 & 70 (discussing elements of vouching in).
90. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1949) (citing Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (form of notice must be reasonably calculated to give actual
notice and an opportunity to be heard).
[Vol. 42:121
VOUCHING: IN OR OUT?
notice which complies with due process must allow a party to choose whether
to appear or default. 9l The requirement that notice of vouching in be timely
affords the vouchee the choice of accepting or refusing the tendered defense. 92
In evaluating the timeliness of vouching in notice, some courts have consid-
ered the location of the parties, 93 the complexity of the litigation, 94 and the
vouchee's ability to participate in settlement proceedings. 95 The voucher
should notify the vouchee soon after the institution of litigation in order to
permit complete control of the pretrial proceedings by the vouchee. 96 When
several communications compose the vouching in notice, courts have meas-
ured timeliness from the point at which the vouchee receives notice rather
than when the voucher initiates correspondence. 97 Many courts, however,
91. See id. (defendant's right to appear has little value unless defendant is informed of
his interests and is capable of determining whether to acquiesce to or contest pending action).
92. See Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, -, 579 P.2d
48, 52 (1978) (original judgment binds vouchee if vouchee receives timely notice of original
action and refuses defense); U.S. Wire & Cable Co. v. Ascher Corp., 34 N.J. 121, -, 167
A.2d 633, 636 (1961) (indemnitor must have timely notice of original suit or judgment will not
bind him).
93. See Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, 693, 509 P.2d 86, 90
(1973). The vouchee in Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc. was a California-based manufac-
turer who would have had to conduct a defense to the action in Washington state. Id. at 693,
509 P.2d at 90. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the location of the parties
complicated the litigation and necessitated an early notice of tender of defense. Id. The court
held, therefore, that tenders of defense on September 25 and October 24, 1969, for a trial set
for November 10, 1969, were untimely. Id.
94. See id. The court in Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc. noted that the complexity
of the litigation would require the vouchee to conduct investigative tests and assemble expert
testimony in preparation for trial. Id.
95. See United New York Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Rodermond Indus., 394 F.2d 65,
73 (3d Cir. 1968). In United New York Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Rodermond Indus., the
plaintiff commenced the original litigation on September 16, 1953, and the defendant-voucher
did not tender defense of the suit until April 3, 1959. Id. In Sandy Hook, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that the voucher could not seriously contend that
the vouchee could have had complete control of all relevant pretrial proceedings. Id. Of
particular concern to the Third Circuit in Sandy Hook was the fact that the vouchee had been
denied the opportunity to effect a favorable settlement. Id. The Third Circuit emphasized that
it was insufficient to say that the voucher had afforded the vouchee an opportunity to settle at
a later date. Id. The Third Circuit in Sandy Hook also stated that early notice is necessary not
only for adequate trial preparation, but also for the vouchee to assert control over the direction
of the defense. Id. The Third Circuit emphasized that the voucher must tender the defense early
enough in the litigation to enable the vouchee to decide what avenues the defense will take. Id.
For example, the vouchee must have time to decide what legal theories to use and when. Id.
Consequently, the Sandy Hook court held that the fact that the voucher had briefed the vouchee
on the voucher's pretrial activities and had left the vouchee to act out the voucher's trial script
constituted insufficient notice. Id.
96. See Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, -, 579 P.2d
48, 52 (1978) (voucher must give notice immediately after institution of suit to permit complete
control of pretrial proceedings by vouchee); U.S. Wire & Cable Co. v. Ascher Corp., 34 N.J.
121, -, 167 A.2d 633, 637 (1961) (voucher must give notice soon after institution of suit to
afford vouchee complete control of pretrial proceedings).
97. See U.S. Wire & Cable Co. v. Ascher Corp., 34 N.J. 121, -, 167 A.2d 633, 636
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have not adopted a clearly defined time period within which a vouching in
notice must fall to be timely.98 If a potential vouchee has been involved in
pretrial investigations and proceedings, a tender of defense as little as one
week before trial may be sufficiently timely to bind the vouchee. 9
After receiving a tender of defense, the vouchee must decide whether or
not to accept the defense. Courts have suggested that the vouchee should
accept a tendered defense when the facts at the time of tender demonstrate
that liability eventually would fall on the vouchee, thereby placing the
vouchee under a duty to defend.1m° Although the rule that a vouchee should
accept a tendered defense when he is likely to be held ultimately liable
(1961). In U.S. Wire & Cable Co. v. Ascher Corp., plaintiff commenced the original suit
against the defendant-voucher on February 28, 1958. Id. at , 167 A.2d at 635. By letter of
March 11, 1958, the voucher advised the vouchee that in the event of the voucher's liability in
the original litigation, the voucher would hold the vouchee responsible for indemnity. Id. The
voucher stated that this letter was to give the vouchee "timely notice" of the suit, and requested
an indication of what role the vouchee would play in the defense. Id. By a second letter of
October 3, 1958, the voucher reiterated that the vouchee should take responsibility for the
defense and assume any liability adjudged. Id. at -, 167 A.2d at 635-36. The vouchee failed
to accede to this demand, and the voucher proceeded to trial on October 20, 1958. Id. at -,
167 A.2d at 636. In the voucher's subsequent indemnity suit against the vouchee, the court
refused to hold the vouchee to the determinations of the earlier proceeding. Id. at -, 167
A.2d at 637. The court noted that the letter of March 11, 1958, contained no demand to assume
the defense of the earlier action, and although the letter of October 2, 1958, at least impliedly
offered to surrender control of the defense, this letter came only seventeen days before trial.
Id. By the time the vouchee received the second letter, the voucher's counsel had accomplished
all of the preliminary preparation. Id. The Ascher court held, therefore, that the notice of
vouching in was untimely. Id.
98. See West Indian Co. v. S.S. Empress of Canada, 277 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(vouching in notice fifteen months after institution of original suit was timely); Ford Motor
Co. v. Bendix Corp., 83 Mich. App. 108, 111, 268 N.W.2d 305, 307 (1978) (vouching in tender
five days before trial was timely); Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz.
10, -, 579 P.2d 48, 50 (1978) (tender of notice one week before trial was timely). But see
United New York Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Rodermond Indus., 394 F.2d 65, 73 (3d Cir.
1968) (tender six years after institution of original suit was untimely); Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt
Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, -, 509 P.2d 86, 90 (1973) (tender of defense eighteen days
before trial was untimely); U.S. Wire & Cable Co. v. Ascher Corp., 34 N.J. 121, -, 167
A.2d 633, 637 (1961) (tender of control of suit seventeen days before trial was untimely).
99. See Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 119 Ariz. 10, -, 579 P.2d
48, 50 (1978). In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., the voucher Litton first
tendered defense of the original action to the vouchee Shaw some five months prior to trial and
the vouchee refused the tender. Id. at -, 579 P.2d at 49. The vouchee's local counsel,
however, requested and received copies of all depositions, interrogatories and photographs in
the possession of vouchee's counsel. Id. at -, 579 P.2d at 50. Local counsel also represented
the vouchee at the pretrial conference. Id. One week before the trial the voucher again tendered
defense of the action, and again the vouchee refused. Id. Although the Litton court did not
state explicitly that tender only one week before trial would have been timely, the court implied
that because of the vouchee's involvement in the pretrial proceedings, the one week time period
would have been sufficient. Id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Bendix Corp., 83 Mich. App. 108,
111, 268 N.W.2d 305, 307 (1978) (tender of defense five days before trial was timely where
vouchee had notice of action and had participated in discovery).
100. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 444 F.2d 727,
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appears clear and concise, practical applications have proven problematic.
One court has characterized the potential vouchee's choice as calling for an
uncanny ability to foresee at the pretrial stage the eventual outcome of the
original suit. 10' The resulting trend is that the vouchee will be most likely to
reject the tendered defense when numerous contributors to the original
liability exist. 0 2 Likewise, courts will be most likely to uphold the vouchee's
rejection of the defense and afford no preclusive effect to the original
judgment when the cause of the original liability is unclear. 03
In spite of numerous objections by vouchees, courts generally have
granted preclusive effect to judgments rendered after the vouchee has rejected
a tendered defense.' °4 Courts, therefore, need to analyze the rationale under-
lying a procedure that allows the determinations of one suit to bind the
734 (3d Cir. 1971) (vouchee must defend when facts of case indicate that liability will fall upon
vouchee); Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, 694, 509 P.2d 86, 90 (1973)
(citing Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1972) (facts at time of voucher's
tender of defense must demonstrate that liability will fall upon vouchee)).
101. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 444 F.2d 727,
734 (3d Cir. 1971). In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit described the vouchee's duty to indemnify
as inconsistent and erratic. Id. The Humble Oil court was critical of a strict application of the
rule requiring the acceptance of the tender of defense because the vouchee's choice in actual
fact situations often is not clear cut. Id.
102. See Transit Casualty Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 436, 438 (S.D. Tex. 1965)
(vouchee rejected tender because multiple factors contributed to liability).
103. See id. In Transit Casualty Co. v. United States, a United States Marshal seized" a
ship and transported it to Bishop Marine Service which docked the ship. Id. at 436. All of the
docks in the area, including Bishop's, previously has been severely damaged by a hurricane. Id.
at 437. As a result, the shipyards lacked water, lights, and firefighting equipment. Id. The ship
burned while in Bishop's custody, and the shipowner's insurer, Transit Casualty Company,
sued the United States. Id. The United States attempted to vouch in Bishop. Id. Bishop refused
to accept the defense and the district court refused to enforce the United States' settlement with
the owner against Bishop. Id. at 438. The Transit court noted that the United States had failed
to show that any of Bishop's actions proximately caused the damage to the ship. Id. Because
so many factors could have caused the damage to the ship the court refused to hold the vouchee
liable. Id. at 438-39. But see Ford Motor Co. v. W.F. Holt & Sons, 335 F. Supp. 775, 778
(M.D. Tenn.), modified, 453 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1067 (1972). In
Ford Motor Co. v. W.F. Holt & Sons, Ford Motor Company sued its general contractor, W.F.
Holt & Sons, for indemnity sums that Ford had paid for the personal injury of a subcontractor's
employee. Id. at 777. Ford had attempted to vouch in W.F. Holt & Sons, but the general
contractor refused to take over the defense. Id. The voucher Ford settled the personal injury
claim and the court subsequently enforced Ford's settlement against the vouchee W.F. Holt &
Sons. Id. at 777-78. Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee asserted that a jury might have found that the injured employee was guilty of
proximate negligence which caused the accident. Id. at 778. A jury also could have found that
the subcontractor was guilty of contributory negligence which caused the accident. Id. In
addition, the Ford court noted that a jury might have determined that the voucher was guilty
of negligence which contributed to the accident, or that the voucher was guilty of proximate
negligence which alone caused the accident. Id. The Ford case demonstrates, therefore, that no
matter how dispersed the original liability appears, a court may still bind the vouchee to the
judgment of the original suit.
104. See Ford Motor Co. v. W.F. Holt & Sons, 335 F. Supp. 775, 778 (M.D. Tenn.) (court
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vouchee, when the vouchee was neither a party to the original action nor
within the personal jurisdiction of the court hearing the original action. The
basis for the doctrine that permits original determinations to bind the vouchee
is that the vouchee is no longer a disinterested party to the suit once he
stated vouchee could not complain of voucher's actions in view of indemnity contract between
voucher and vouchee), modified, 453 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1067
(1972); Carole Stupell, Ltd. v. Blenko Glass Co., 137 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (W.D. Va. 1955)
(court unimpressed with vouchee's criticism of voucher in light of fact that vouchee left voucher
sole responsibility for defense of action). In an indemnity claim, the trial court generally
examines a number of questions concerning the original claim including whether the voucher
sent notice of the incident, notice of the claim, and notice of the filing of the lawsuit to the
vouchee. See Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc. v. Barge Chem 300, 546 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir.
1977) (setting out parameters of indemnity court's inquiry into voucher/vouchee relationship).
The trial court should also examine whether the voucher has tendered control of the claim and
defense of the action to the vouchee. Id. Finally, the court must address whether fraud or
collusion existed in the original action and examine the circumstances surrounding the payment
of any settlement in the first action. Id.
The charge of collusive settlement or fraudulent tactics between the original plaintiff and
defendant-voucher is popular among vouchees, but the claim is not always a successful defense
in an indemnity action. See Stewart & Foulke, Inc. v. Robertshaw Controls, Co., 397 F.2d 971,
973 (5th Cir. 1968) (vouchee's claim of collusion rejected even though original parties reached
settlement of original claim and continued to trial two weeks later); see also Dixon v. Fiat-
Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, 694, 509 P.2d 86, 90-91 (1973) (claim of ineffectual
defense based upon conflict of interest between vouchee and voucher). For example, in a
products liability context in Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., the retailer-voucher attempted
to demonstrate that an alleged defect occurred during manufacturing. Id. at 694, 509 P.2d at
91. Conversely, the manufacturer-vouchee in Dixon endeavored to show that the defect occurred
subsequent to manufacturing. Id. The conflict of interest between the manufacturer and retailer
was so clear that the Dixon court held that the vouching in device was inapplicable. Id.
In at least one case, the court upheld the vouchee's claim of collusion. See Grummons v.
Zollinger, 240 F. Supp. 63, 66-67 (N.D. Ind. 1964). The actions of the parties in Grummons v.
Zollinger demonstrate an example of collusion in the worst degree. Id. The plaintiff and
defendant in the original suit had effected a settlement before the action went to trial and
judgment was entered. Id. at 68. Attorneys for the plaintiff and defendant-voucher exchanged
correspondence in which they agreed to make a deal to settle the case in order to proceed
against the vouchee. Id. The attorneys for the plaintiff and defendant-voucher arranged to have
their expert testify to bolster the action against the vouchee. Id. The goal of the original parties
was to fashion a strong indemnity suit against the vouchee. Id. The court in the indemnity
action refused to bind the vouchee to the results of the earlier actions between the plaintiff and
defendant-voucher. Id. at 76.
At least one commentator has indicated that the vouchee's defenses are limited to denial
of notice and opportunity to defend, denial of the alleged warranty or duty to reimburse the
voucher, and denial that the original claim is within the coverage of the vouchee's obligation.
See 1 B. J. MooRE, J. LUCAS, T. CURRIER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.405[9] (2d ed. 1983).
In the products liability context, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri in City of Clayton v. Grumman Emergency Products, Inc. stated that to establish a
right of indemnity the voucher must prove that he bought the defective item from the vouchee-
manufacturer and that the same warranties the voucher-retailer made to his customer were made
to the retailer by the manufacturer. 576 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (E.D. Mo. 1983). The retailer
must also prove that the defect on which the manufacturer's breach of warranty liability was
established constituted a breach by the manufacturer of the same warranty as made to the
retailer, and that the retailer gave notice of the consumer's lawsuit against him to the
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receives notice of the suit and opportunity to defend. 10 5 Upon receiving
notice, the vouchee has the right to appear and defend the action and may
employ any defense strategies or tactics to controvert the claim.' 6 The
presumption that the vouchee has a duty to appear or be bound by the
outcome of the original suit is based on the premise that the court hearing
the original action has the power to bind the nonappearing vouchee to its
determinations. 0 7 The presumption that a court which lacks personal juris-
diction nevertheless can have preclusive power over a vouchee is the novelty
of the vouching in device. Whether or not vouching in is to remain a valid
procedure in modern litigation depends upon whether modern notions of
due process and personal jurisdiction can be reconciled with this extra-
jurisdictional presumption of preclusive power.
The presumption that a court can have preclusive power over a vouchee
derives in part from the relationship between the voucher and the vouchee.'0 s
The voucher/vouchee relationship may arise though contract 0 9 or by opera-
tion of law." 0 The vouchee's relationship with the voucher renders the
vouchee primarily liable for any acts of negligence by the voucher.", The
court may bind the vouchee regardless of whether the vouchee appeared and
defended in the original action." 2 To bind the vouchee to the determinations
of the earlier litigation, however, a court must find that the basis for the
manufacturer. Id. The court in City of Clayton implied, therefore, that the vouchee could avoid
indemnity by demonstrating the absence of any one of these factors. Id.
105. See Grummons v. Zollinger, 240 F. Supp. 63, 75 (N.D. Ind. 1964) (quoting Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 281 N.Y. 162, 22 N.E.2d 324, 326
(1939)) (vouchee who receives notice is not stranger to suit); Olin's Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v.
Royal Continental Hotels, Inc. 187 So.2d 349, 351 (Fla. 1966) (quoting Littleton v. Richardson,
34 N.H. 179, 187 (1856)) (vouchee's notice of right to appear and defend brings him within
original action).
106. See supra note 8 (discussing vouchee's right to control defense of original suit).
107. See supra notes 2, 10 & 11 (discussing binding effect of vouching in).
108. See supra note 2 (discussing relationship between indemnitor and indemnitee).
109. See Ford Motor Co. v. W.F. Holt & Sons, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 775, 778 (M.D. Tenn.)
(contract of indemnity between voucher and vouchee bound vouchee to voucher's good faith
settlement of original claim), modified, 453 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1067 (1972).
110. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 444 F.2d 727,
734 (3d Cir. 1971) (shipowner attempts to vouch in stevedore in suit by injured longshoreman).
In Humble Oil, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted
that no contractual agreement existed between the parties regarding the defense of possible suits
by injured longshoremen: Id. Nevertheless, the district court found that the voucher-stevedore's
duty to defend arose because it was readily apparent that claims of negligence and unseawor-
thiness were matters within the stevedore's responsibility. Id. The Third Circuit ultimately found
that the stevedore's duty was not as clear cut as the district court had described it. Id. The
Third Circuit, however, had no quarrel with the lower court's enunciation of the general rule
that the vouchee had a duty to defend. Id.
111. See SCAC Transport (USA), Inc. v. S.S. Danaos, 578 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (vouchee is ultimately responsible for any negligence arising out of voucher/vouchee
relationship).
112. See id.; see also supra note 2 (discussing binding effect of vouching in).
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vouchee's liability to the voucher is the same as the defendant-voucher's
basis of liability to the plaintiff in the original action." 3
A comparison of the concept of vouching in with other examples of
judicial power and preclusion is helpful in reconciling vouching in's extra-
jurisdictional presumption of preclusive power with modern notions of due
process and personal jurisdiction. Vouching in supplied the common-law
roots for the modern device of impleader." 4 The modern impleader procedure
is a device that also brings third parties into an action and binds them to
the judgments of the court." 5 Unlike vouching in, however, personal juris-
diction over the impleaded third-party defendant is a prerequisite to the use
of impleader." 6 Impleader also has a procedural advantage over vouching in
because impleader requires only one action for a complete adjudication of
the rights and obligations of all interested parties while vouching in requires
two separate adjudications.' 7 Furthermore, in a vouching in procedure the
voucher must surrender complete control of the suit to the vouchee,"
s
whereas impleader allows the original defendant to continue to direct his
own defense independent of the tactics employed by the impleaded third-
party defendant.' 9
113. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Evans Pipe Co., 432 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1970) (golf
course pipe supplier's liability to contractor for breach of warranty was identical to contractor's
liability to country club); Hessler v. Hillwood Mfg. Co., 302 F.2d 61, 62 (6th Cir. 1962) (liability
for manufacturer's breach of warranty of fitness and merchantability to retailer was same as
retailer's liability for breach of warranty to customer).
114. See 3 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL. PRACTICE 14.02 (1984) (roots of impleader stem
from common-law procedure of vouching to warranty). Professor Moore notes that impleader
or third-party practice was meant to supplement and not to supplant vouching in. Id.; see also
West Indian Co. v. S.S. Empress of Canada, 277 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (impleader has
not abolished vouching in); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., 177 Ind. App.
508, -, 380 N.E.2d 571, 581 (1978) (impleader supplements vouching in but does not replace
it).
115. See 3 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 14.02 (1984) (general purpose of
impleader is to avoid multiplicity and reduplication in litigation by joining all appropriate
parties in one action). Professor Moore explains that impleader is a procedure whereby a party
to a suit may bring in additional parties to afford a full and complete adjudication. Id.; see
also Stiber v. United States, 60 F.R.D. 668, 670 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (purpose of impleader is to
allow parties to resolve conflicting claims in one judicial proceeding).
116. See 3 J. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.2811] (1984) (impleader requires
jurisdiction over third-party defendant); cf. SCAC Transport (USA) Inc., v. S.S. Danaos, 578
F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (vouching in is valid alternative to impleader when lack of
personal jurisdiction forecloses use of impleader).
117. See 1 B J. MOORE, J. LucAs, T. CURRIER, MooE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.02 (1984)
(two suits are necessary in vouching in when voucher found liable and vouchee refuses
indemnity); see also 3 J. MOORE, J. LucAs, T. CURRIER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 14.02
(1984) (purpose of impleader is to avoid multiple actions and reduplication of evidence).
118. See supra notes 8, 94 & 95 and accompanying text (discussing vouchee's control of
defense of original suit).
119. See 3 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.02 (1984) (defendant retains control
of his defense under impleader).
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In addition to vouching in, a second example of extra-jurisdictional
power is the "bulge rule"'' 2 of rule 4(f)121 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 4(f) authorizes service of process outside the territorial limits
of a state up to a distance of 100 miles from the district court in which the
action was brought.12 Rule 4(f) permits service to run beyond the geograph-
ical and territorial limits of the state to bring in additional parties to secure
more complete relief in a pending action. 23 The purpose of rule 4(f) is to
extend the boundaries of state courts in order to adjudicate all the rights
and obligations involved in a controversy.1 4
The United States Supreme Court in Insurance Corporation of Ireland
v. Compagnie Des Bauxites'25 provided another exercise of judicial power
which helps to reconcile the apparent discrepancies between vouching in and
modern notions of due process and personal jurisdiction. In Ireland, respond-
ent Compagnie des Bauxites sued petitioner Ireland and several other foreign
insurance companies in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania for an alleged breach of an insurance contract.
26
Ireland raised the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. 27 Compagnie des
Bauxites attempted to use discovery in order to establish jurisdictional
facts. 28 After repeated failures by Ireland to comply with the district court's
orders for production of the requested information, the court imposed
personal jurisdiction on Ireland as a sanction. 29 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Ireland argued that imposing jurisdiction as a discovery sanction was
an impermissible creation of judicial power.'30 The Supreme Court disagreed,
120. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 76 F.R.D. 214, 215 (D. Conn. 1977). The bulge rule
of rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits service of process ". . . at all places
outside the state ... but within the United States that are not more than 100 miles from the
place in which the action is commenced. . . ." Id. (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 4(f)).
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
122. See Deloro Smelting & Refining Co. v. Engelhard Minerals & Chem. Corp., 313 F.
Supp. 470, 474 (D.N.J. 1970) (rule 4(f) authorizes service of process to any place in United
States within 100 mile radius "as the crow flies" from place where action was commenced).
123. See 2 J. MooRE & J. Lucks, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.42[2] (1984) (goal of
rule 4(f) is to guarantee presence of parties necessary for full and just adjudication).
124. See id. (purpose of bulge rule is to extend state boundaries in order to determine an
entire controversy).
125. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
126. Id. at 698.
127. Id.
128. Id. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, Compagnie des Bauxites
requested copies of numerous insurance policies in an effort to establish Ireland's jurisdictional
contacts. Id. Ireland objected to the discovery requests as burdensome. Id.
129. Id. at 698-99. The district court in Ireland ordered Ireland to respond to the discovery
requests of Compagnie des Bauxites. Id. at 698. The district court ordered Ireland to produce
the requested documents in July of 1978, on November 8, 1978, and on December 31, 1978.
Id. at 698-99. On April 19, 1979, the district court, after noting that Ireland still had not
complied with the discovery order, imposed personal jurisdiction on Ireland. Id. at 699.
130. Id. at 701. In Ireland, petitioner Ireland argued that the imposition of jurisdiction
was merely judicial fiat. Id. Petitioner argued that imposing jurisdiction as a discovery sanction
created judicial power where the power did not actually exist. Id.
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however, explaining that Ireland had confused and merged the concepts of
personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.' The Court stated that
the power of a court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction derives from
article III of the Constitution. 3 2 The Constitution's characterization of
subject matter jurisdiction functions as a restriction on federal power and
defines the parameters of the federal sovereign. 33 Actions by the parties to
a suit therefore cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court, since
article III directly limits actions within federal court jurisdiction. 34 Personal
jurisdiction, in contrast, is a function not of article III, but of the due
process clause. 135 The Supreme Court stated that personal jurisdiction restricts
judicial power as a matter of individual liberty and not as a matter of
sovereignty. 136
The Supreme Court's characterization of due process and personal
jurisdiction as matters of individual liberty conflicts with the Court's descrip-
tion of due process as an instrument of interstate federalism in World-Wide
Volkswagen. 37 In a footnote to the Ireland decision, the Court addressed
this conflict, stating that World-Wide Volkswagen's restrictions on state
sovereign power ultimately must be viewed as a function of the individual
liberty interest that the due process clause preserves. 3 The Ireland Court
explained that the requirement that courts must have personal jurisdiction
over parties in adjudications arose solely from the due process clause. 139 The
due process clause itself makes no mention of the concepts of federalism or
state sovereignty. 40 Furthermore, as the Ireland Court noted, it is possible
for defendants to waive the personal jurisdiction requirements, while individ-
uals cannot by their actions create subject matter jurisdiction. 14' The Court
emphasized that the elements of federalism and state sovereignty, therefore,
are distinct and separate from the concepts of personal jurisdiction and due
process. 42 The Supreme Court thus held that the imposition of personal
jurisdiction against Ireland did not violate due process.
143
Under traditional jurisdictional principles, the due process analysis fo-
cused on whether sufficient minimum contacts existed between the parties
131. Id.
132. Id. at 701-02.




137. See supra note 12 (discussing due process clause as instrument of interstate federalism).




141. Id. at 701-02.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 709.
[Vol. 42:121
VOUCHING: IN OR OUT?
and the forum state to justify the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction. 44
Vouching in, however, eliminates any analysis of contacts between the
vouchee and the forum, and focuses instead on the relationship between the
voucher and the vouchee.' 4 Vouching in, therefore, emphasizes the fairness
element of due process' 46 rather than the jurisdictional element of due
process. 47 Before Ireland, personal jurisdiction cases had linked minimum
contacts and notions of fairness as jointly defining state sovereign limits on
assertions of personal jurisdiction over unconsenting defendants. 4 By em-
phasizing the element of fairness in due process, vouching in serves the
valuable function of reconciling theoretical consistency with practical fair-
ness. By focusing on the relationship between the voucher and the vouchee
rather than on the vouchee's contacts with the forum, vouching in allows
the courts to place liability on the party ultimately responsible. The Ireland
Court's apparent disregard of minimum contacts as a limitation on the
sovereign power of states appears to smooth the inconsistencies between
vouching in and traditional notions of due process and personal jurisdiction.
In Ireland, the Court affirmed the imposition of personal jurisdiction over
an unconsenting defendant in the absence of a showing of minimum con-
tacts. 49 Similarly, vouching in binds the unconsenting vouchee to the judg-
ment of the original action despite the absence of personal jurisdiction over
the vouchee in the original action. 50 Vouching in, therefore, which appears
to be out after World-Wide Volkswagen's emphasis on federalism-" is now
in as a result of Ireland's emphasis on fairness.
PAUL STEPHEN WARE
144. See supra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text (discussing development of minimum
contacts analysis).
145. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text (discussing voucher/vouchee relation-
ship).
146. See supra text accompanying note 29 (discussing "fairness" of maintenance of suit).
147. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing personal jurisdiction as
element of due process).
148. See supra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text (discussing development of minimum
contacts analysis); see also Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S.
694, 714 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring). In Ireland, Justice Powell criticized the majority's
decision for what he saw as an abandonment of the minimum contacts analysis. Id. Justice
Powell viewed the Ireland Court's imposition of personal jurisdiction as redefining the personal
jurisdiction inquiry from an analysis of minimum contacts to a focus on abstract notions of
fairness. Id.
149. See id. at 713.
150. See supra notes 9 & 10 (discussing binding effect of vouching in).
151. See supra notes 14, 16 & 18 (discussing federalism and inadmissibility of indirect
assertions of jurisdiction).
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